Monday, April 6, 2015

Problem-Oriented policing model and Intelligence-Led policing model

The first police force was created in 1829 by Sir Robert Peel; he created 17 metropolitan police divisions in London. By 1856 the rest of the country was required to establish a police force. Since then, many different models of policing have been developed and experimented with, developments in policing and crime control were fairly rapid during the 1990s, this is due to many reasons such as; changing patterns of crime, changing demands on the police, and changing expectations of the police and their role in communities.
The two models of policing that will be outlined and discussed in this essay are the Problem-Oriented policing model and the Intelligence-Led policing model. They each differ from one another substantially and across a range of dimensions, they differ in means and ends, methods and priorities, techniques and successes. However, they do also share some common features in their methods despite differing in the reasons for doing so.
The Intelligence-Led policing model is home grown from the United Kingdom, it draws upon the notion that the police can and do know a great deal about offending patterns. It addresses the supposed failure of the police to address the systemic sources of crime and patterns within crime. The main thought is that the police and should actively pursue information about criminals and their organisation (Tilley 2003). The Audit Commission (1993) prescribed a proactive approach, targeting the criminal not the crime and making more use of intelligence. Carrying out this proactive approach involves effectively sourcing, assembling and analysing intelligence about criminals and their activities to disrupt their offending. Done so by targeting enforcement and patrol where the activity is the most common (Tilley 2003). The core emphases of the Intelligence-Led policing model are; the focus on crime alone, the means used are enforcement and the disruption of criminal groups; these measures are aimed at reducing the problem by undermining the ability of criminals to do their business. These activities are informed by the intelligence gained from the analysts about understanding the business of the criminals; all organisations involved are enforcement agencies in order to successfully aid the focus of this method. It is enforcing the practical business of policing more smartly, using information technology and modern methods (Tilley 2003).
The Problem-Oriented policing model however, is more of a global movement with American origins. It embraces an analytic approach which takes community concerns seriously whilst developing strategic responses that aim to deal effectively with issues underlying police-relevant community problems, the origins of this method lie within the work of Goldstein (1979). It incorporates an explicit conception of the nature and role of modern policing, with officer imagination, local discretion and community resources being used where it is relevant to do so (Tilley 2003). The Problem-Oriented policing model also stresses substance and effectiveness over process and style, it is pre-dominantly evidence based. Goldstein outlines several purposes of this method of policing, they are; to prevent and control conduct which threatens life and property, to aid victims and protect those in danger of physical harm, to protect constitutional guarantees, to facilitate the movement of people and vehicles, to assist those who cannot care for themselves, to resolve conflict between individuals, groups or citizens and their government, to identify problems which may escalate for individuals, the police or even the government and to create and maintain a feeling of security in the community (Goldstein 1977, described in Scott 2000). The aim is to achieve these said purposes by systematically addressing relevant problems in the community; the identified problems should then be thoroughly researched and understood. Relevant responses should be identified and targeted on the basis of this analysis (Tilley 2003).
Already it is clear that there are differences in the focus points of both models; however a common factor between these models is the use of analysis, intelligence and computers. Both the Intelligence-Led policing model and the Problem-Oriented policing model use these new methods due to the issue that criminality is becoming more sophisticated and mobile, the identification of patterns is beyond the capability of localised, informal methods of identification (NCIS 2000). Therefore, up to date intelligence allows for speedy well targeted interventions in an ever-changing society of criminals and varying criminal organisation (Tilley 2003). Computers are used as they enable better management of the flow of information that the police receive about criminals, their behaviour and organisation (Tilley 2003). Through this, smarter action can be taken to control them through deterrence, disruption, arrest or incarceration, as the information is organised and easy to access; it is easier and quicker to create an operation to take down criminals. The improved quality of the analysis is due to the improved quality of the intelligence systems. Both of the models of policing heavily rely on analysing data. Analysis converts raw information into actionable intelligence by seeking patterns in crime data, seeing the similarities in criminal events and constructing profiles (Cope 2004). It offers a synthesis of data about crime that is developed out of context (Peterson 1990) and also provides the opportunity to rationalise policing (Manning 2001). The two models of policing require specialist analysts, these analysts make much more systematic use of information and often call for information collection as well as use of information already at hand (Tilley 2003).
Although both policing methods use analysis, the information which they seek is different. The analysis method has sound foundations within the principles of Problem-Oriented policing (Goldstein 1979). The focus on information collection is on problematic patterns of behaviour that produce police-relevant problems for the community and on plausible points of intervention to reduce them, remove them or prevent the harm cause by them (Clarke and Eck 2003). The analysis tends to focus on enduring problems that are not responsive to standard forms of policing, therefore its focus spans relatively long periods and relatively wide spaces so that there is much more data readily available from records (Tilley 2003). It calls for the close specification of problems and the problem along with its analysis comes first.
Analysis is also integral to the theory of the Intelligence-Led policing model. It is on a ‘need to know’ security principle (NCIS 2000). The process of this model exemplifies concerns with identifying, prioritizing and intervening to minimise risk. Intelligence can be understood as information developed to direct police action (Cope 2004). The Intelligence-Led policing model is fed by intelligence products, of which there are four types; firstly strategic assessments, these provide a longer term picture of trends possibly with forecasts for the future, secondly tactical assessments, these are short term and are aligned to the tactical menu, thirdly target profiles, these profiles describe the offenders and their associates to inform operations against them and lastly problem profiles, these profiles identify emerging series of offenders or hotspots for crime (Cope 2004) all the information which is put forward in these products is actively sought. The focus of information collection and analysis in the Intelligence-Led policing model is on offenders and their networking patterns, and to inform smart enforcement focused on serious and prolific offending patterns. It tends to naturally focus on current or very recent offending patterns. The intelligence used is often gained from informants and is done so covertly, whereas the Problem-Oriented policing model rarely needs or uses covertly collected information and information from informants. The Intelligence-Led policing model leaves little if any space for analysis of none-crime problems, the major information task is thus finding and drawing together ways of tracking offender and offending patterns as they emerge, and disrupting them through targeted enforcement (Tilley 2003). Crime analysis is crucial for this method of policing to work effectively because it endeavours to deliver the right information to the right people at the right time (Fletcher 2000).
The Intelligence-Led policing model and the Problem-Oriented policing model both note the association between repeat victimisation and prolific offending. For the Problem-Oriented policing model repeat victimisation comprises a major pattern of problem events requiring systematic attention (Pease 1998). Repeat offenders appear to be largely responsible for repeat offences (Everson and Pease 2001). Therefore focusing proactive enforcement efforts on those already victimised is an efficient way of targeting prolific offenders. This falls in line with the Intelligence-Led policing model which steers attention towards this. However, the Problem-Oriented policing model is also concerned with non-enforcement methods of reducing the vulnerability of those already victimised (Tilley 2003).
The way in which the models of policing are enforced differs on a much larger scale. The Problem-Oriented policing model is carried out by crime prevention officers and crime pattern analysts. It implies attention to problems exploiting available pinch-points in the conditions generating problems (Tilley 2002). This may include targeting prolific offenders, criminal organisations, those recruiting new criminals or stolen goods markets, any or all of which are likely to be focused on in the Intelligence-Led policing model. However, the major difference is that the Problem-Oriented policing model is also interested in finding pinch-points that do require enforcement. These will often include reductions in opportunity of the sort stressed in situational crime prevention (Braga 2002). Situational crime prevention reduces the criminals opportunities to commit crime for example making changes in the environment to make the criminal believe that the crime is not worth committing as it is too risky, this is something which the Problem-Oriented policing model endorses in its methods of policing via the problem analysis triangle, this consists of; the offender or source of complaint, a victim or victims and a location or characteristics of locations (Cohen and Felson 1979). Problems can be removed or ameliorated by altering one or more of the three problem features with the aid of situational crime prevention
Crackdown and consolidation strategies are plausible candidates for many problems addressed in the Problem-Oriented Policing model (Wright 1994). The crackdown side agrees with the Intelligence-Led policing model, for both it involves efforts to target intensive, well publicised enforcement to incapacitate and/or deter offenders creating problems, this can also have beneficial side-effect beyond the operation of the crackdown (Sherman 1990). The Problem-Oriented policing model however will be equally concerned with consolidation, the introduction of measures to produce sustained falls in crime during the lull created by the crackdown (Tilley 2003).
In addition to this, the Problem-Oriented policing model embraces concerns that extend beyond law enforcement. It is relevant to all police-relevant problems. Smart enforcement is needed for some but not all issues that are addressed by the police, for example a child going missing from home is more of a problem for policing but not smart enforcement. Various long-term crime problems are more open to non-enforcement preventive interventions than they are smart enforcement. Few enduring crime or non-crime problems are effectively dealt with by enforcement alone (Tilley 2003). This leads to the Problem-Oriented policing model to be seen as more community friendly as it does not ignore their needs; it focuses on all problems in society.
On the other hand, the Intelligence-Led policing model is carried out mainly by intelligence officers and Criminal Investigation Departments (CID). It is the outcome of a desire to professionalise the intelligence discipline within the law enforcement (NCIS 2000). Enforcement can be made smarter by assiduously assembling analysing and acting upon information relating to the activities and organisation of major offenders (Tilley 2003). The Intelligence-Led policing model works at three interconnecting levels; level one covers local issues and volume crime, level two covers cross border issues, where crime issues cross jurisdictional borders and where intelligence needs to be shared, and level three covers serious and organised crime operating on a national or international scale (Tilley 2003). Although it does not cover issues which do not require smart enforcement like the Problem-Oriented policing model does, it covers issues which spread overseas and could be considered a more professional business type method of policing.
Within the Intelligence-Led policing model there is a tasking and co-ordination group which is central to this method. The group has meetings which set the agenda for intelligence gathering, receiving intelligence, making tactical assessments, allocating law enforcement effort and reviewing said efforts, all of which are crucial elements of this model of policing. The meetings are made up of four main elements; the first being targeting offenders, the second is the management of hotspots, the third is the investigation of offences and the fourth is the application of preventative measures such as CCTV (NCIS 2000). The fourth element to this sits well with Problem-Oriented policing as it is essentially a form of situational crime prevention, something which the Problem-Oriented policing model embraces in its method of policing.
It is easy to see that the Intelligence-Led policing model is concerned with traditional police priorities; the detection of crime and the apprehension of serious and prolific offenders (Tilley 2003). Crime is deemed better controllable by better targeting of offenders; therefore the public is better served. The assumption stands that law enforcement is the key function of the police; it shapes what they are concerned with and what they can do.
The two models being discussed both have considerable success in society, however what each model considers to be success proves the real focus point that the model entails. For the Problem-Oriented policing model, success is achieved with the successful amelioration, removal or management of specific police related community problems. For the Intelligence-Led policing model success comes with good arrests and good sentences, the conviction of major, prolific offenders and their severe punishment keeping them away from those they would otherwise have the opportunity to harm (Tilley 2003).
Although the Intelligence-Led policing model comes to play better with traditional grass roots police officers than the other models, it provides no space for the wider conception of police problems and responsibilities which the Problem-Oriented policing model takes on board such as community issues. The Problem-Oriented policing model provides essential space for community models of policing and Intelligent-Led enforcement, which makes it crucially adaptable to changing conditions in society (Tilley 2003).
Source

Sunday, April 5, 2015

Emile Durkheim - Individual and Society

To Durkheim, men were creatures whose desires were unlimited. Unlike other animals, they are not satiated when their biological needs are fulfilled. "The more one has, the more one wants, since satisfactions received only stimulate instead of filling needs." It follows from this natural insatiability of the human animal that his desires can only be held in check by external controls, that is, by societal control. Society imposes limits on human desires and constitutes "a regulative force [which] must play the same role for moral needs which the organism plays for physical needs." In well-regulated societies, social controls set limits on individual propensities so that "each in his sphere vaguely realizes the extreme limits on individual propensities so that "each in his sphere vaguely realizes the extreme limits set to his ambitions and aspires to nothing beyond. . . . Thus, an end or a goal [is] set to the passions."

When social regulations break down, the controlling influence of society on individual propensities is no longer effective and individuals are left to their own devices. Such a state of affairs Durkheim calls anomie, a tern that refers to a condition of relative normlessness in a whole society or in some of its component groups. Anomie does not refer to a state of mind, but to a property of the social structure. It characterizes a condition in which individual desires are no longer regulated by common norms and where, as a consequence, individuals are left without moral guidance in the pursuit of their goals.

Although complete anomie, or total normlessness, is empirically impossible, societies may be characterized by greater or lesser degrees of normative regulations. Moreover, within any particular society, groups may differ in the degree of anomie that besets them. Social change may create anomie either in the whole society or in some parts of it. Business crises, for example, may have a far greater impact on those on the higher reaches of the social pyramid than on the underlying population. When depression leads to a sudden downward mobility, the men affected experience a de-regulation in their lives--a loss of moral certainty and customary expectations that are no longer sustained by the group to which these men once belonged. Similarly, the rapid onset of prosperity may lead some people to a quick upward mobility and hence deprive them of the social support needed in their new styles of life. Any rapid movement in the social structure that upsets previous networks in which life styles are embedded carries with it a chance of anomie.

Durkheim argued that economic affluence, by stimulating human desires, carries with it dangers of anomic conditions because it "deceives us into believing that we depend on ourselves only," while "poverty protects against suicide because it is a restraint in itself." Since the realization of human desires depends upon the resources at hand, the poor are restrained, and hence less prone to suffer from anomie by virtue of the fact that they possess but limited resources. "The less one has the less he is tempted to extend the range of his needs indefinitely."

By accounting for the different susceptibility to anomie in terms of the social process--that is, the relations between individuals rather than the biological propensities of individuals-- Durkheim in effect proposed a specifically sociological theory of deviant behavior even though he failed to point to the general implications of this crucial insight. In the words of Robert K. Merton, who was the first to ferret out in this respect the overall implications of Durkheim's thought and to develop them methodically, "Social structures exert a definite pressure upon certain persons in the society to engage in nonconforming rather than conforming conduct."

Durkheim's program of study, the overriding problems in all his work, concerns the sources of social order and disorder, the forces that make for regulation or de-regulation in the body social. His work on suicide, of which the discussion and analysis of anomie forms a part, must be read in this light. Once he discovered that certain types of suicide could be accounted for by anomie, he could then use anomic suicide as an index for the otherwise unmeasurable degree of social integration. This was not circular reasoning, as could be argued, but a further application of his method of analysis. He reasoned as follows: There are no societies in which suicide does not occur, and many societies show roughly the same rates of suicide over long periods of time. This indicates that suicides may be considered a "normal," that is, a regular, occurrence. However, sudden spurts in the suicide rates of certain groups or total societies are "abnormal" and point to some perturbations not previously present. Hence. "abnormally" high rates in specific groups or social categories, or in total societies, can be taken as an index of disintegrating forces at work in a social structure.

Durkheim distinguished between types of suicide according to the relation of the actor to his society. When men become "detached from society," when they are thrown upon their own devices and loosen the bonds that previously had tied them to their fellow, they are prone to egoistic, or individualistic, suicide. When the normative regulations surrounding individual conduct are relaxed and hence fail to curb and guide human propensities, men are susceptible to succumbing to anomic suicide. To put the matter differently, when the restraints of structural integration, as exemplified in the operation of organic solidarity, fail to operate, men become prone to egoistic suicide; when the collective conscience weakens, men fall victim to anomic suicide.

In addition to egoistic and anomic types of suicide, Durkheim refers to altruistic and fatalistic suicide. The latter is touched upon only briefly in his work, but the former is of great importance for an understanding of Durkheim's general approach. Altruistic suicide refers to cases in which suicide can be accounted for by overly strong regulation of individuals, as opposed to lack of regulation. Durkheim argues in effect that the relation of suicide rates to social regulation is curvilinear--high rates being associated with both excessive individuation and excessive regulation. In the case of excessive regulation, the demands of society are so great that suicide varies directly rather than inversely with the degree of integration. For example, in the instance of the Hindu normative requirement that widows commit ritual suicide upon the funeral pyre of their husbands, or in the case of harikiri, the individual is so strongly attuned to the demands of his society that he is willing to take his own life when the norms so demand. Arguing from statistical data, Durkheim shows that in modern societies the high rates of suicide among the military cannot be explained by the deprivations of military life suffered by the lower ranks, since the suicide rate happens to be higher for officers than for enlisted men. Rather, the high rate for officers can be accounted for by a military code of honor that enjoins a passive habit of obedience leading officers to undervalue their own lives. In such cases, Durkheim is led to refer to too feeble degrees of individuation and to counterpose these to the excesses of individuation or de-regulation, which account, in his view, for the other major forms of suicide.

Durkheim's discussion of altruistic suicide allows privileged access to some of the intricacies of his approach. He has often been accused of having an overly anti-individualistic philosophy, one that is mainly concerned with the taming of individual impulse and the harnessing of the energies of individuals for the purposes of society. Although it cannot be denied that there are such tendencies in his work, Durkheim's treatment of altruistic suicide indicates that he was trying to establish a balance between the claims of individuals and those of society, rather than to suppress individual strivings. Acutely aware of the dangers of the breakdown of social order, he also realized that total control of component social actors by society would be as detrimental as anomie and de-regulation. Throughout his life he attempted to establish a balance between societal and individual claims.

Durkheim was indeed a thinker in the conservative tradition to the extent that he reacted against the atomistic drift of most Enlightenment philosophy and grounded his sociology in a concern for the maintenance of social order. As Robert Nisbet has shown convincingly, such key terms as cohesion, solidarity, integration, authority, ritual, and regulation indicate that his sociology is anchored upon an anti-atomistic set of premises. In this respect he was like his traditionalist forebears, yet it would be a mistake to classify Durkheim as a traditionalist social thinker. Politically he was a liberal--indeed, a defender of the rights of individuals against the state. He also was moved to warn against excesses of regulation over persons even though the major thrusts of his argument were against those who, by failing to recognize the requirements of the social order, were likely to foster anomic states of affairs. Anomie, he argued, was as detrimental to individuals as it was to the social order at large.

Durkheim meant to show that a Spencerian approach to the social realm, an approach in which the social dimension is ultimately derived from the desire of individuals to increase the sum of their happiness, did not stand up before the court of evidence or the court of reason. Arguing against Spencer and the utilitarians, he maintained that society cannot be derived from the propensity of individuals to trade and barter in order to maximize their own happiness. This view fails to account for the fact that people do not trade and barter at random but follow a pattern that is normative. For men to make a contract and live up to it, they must have a prior commitment to the meaning of a contract in its own right. Such prior collective commitment, that is, such a non-contractual element of contracts, constitutes the framework of normative control. No trade or barter can take place without social regulation and some system of positive and negative sanctions.

Durkheim's main shafts against individualistic social theories notwithstanding, he was by no means oblivious of the dangers of overregulation to which Spencer's social philosophy had been especially sensitive. Durkheim saw man as Homo duplex--as body, desire, and appetite and also as socialized personality. But man was specifically human only in the latter capacity, and he became fully human only in and through society. Hence, true moral action lies in the sacrifice of certain individual desires for the service of groups and society. But such sacrifices redound in the last analysis to the benefit of individuals, as well as society, since unbridled desires lead to frustration and unhappiness rather than to bliss and fulfillment. Modern society seems to contain, for Durkheim, the potentialities for individualism within social regulation. In contrast to earlier types of social organization based on mechanical solidarity that demanded a high degree of regimentation, modern types of organization rest on organic solidarity obtained through the functional interdependence of autonomous individuals. In modern societies, social solidarity is dependent upon, rather than repressive of, individual autonomy of conduct.

Though Durkheim stressed that in modern societies a measure of integration was achieved through the intermeshing and mutual dependence of differentiated roles, he came to see that these societies nevertheless could not do without some common integration by a system of common beliefs. In earlier social formations built on mechanical solidarity, such common beliefs are not clearly distinct from the norms through which they are implemented in communal action; in the case of organic solidarity, the detailed norms have become relatively independent from overall beliefs, responding as they do to the exigencies of differentiated role requirements, but a general system of overall beliefs must still exist. Hence Durkheim turned, in the last period of his scholarly life, to the study of religious phenomena as core elements of systems of common beliefs.

Sources.

Monday, March 16, 2015

Wednesday, February 11, 2015

Cohabitation in the UK

Name: Low Gin Tung @ Nick
Lecturer: Miss Mary George
Year: 2014
Grade: Second upper (High)

Question: 
Do you agree that developments in the law - statute and case law - over the last decade not only undervalue and undermine the institution of marriage but also discriminate fairly against those who cannot or decide not to marry?

The law on cohabitation presents an awkward dialectic. On the one hand, there is the ultimate desire to recognise cohabitants’ rights similarly as a married couple; a truly altruistic ideal. Yet, on the other hand, this is negated by the clear need  to uphold the institution of marriage. Analysis of the development of these areas since the 19th century demonstrates quite lucidly the extreme hesitancy of the courts to recognise cohabitants as married couple as can be seen in the case of Gammans v Ekins where it was famously deemed an ‘abuse of the English Language’ to say that an unmarried couple ‘masquerading’ as husband and wife were members of the same family. How far then, have we come, from a starting point of almost blatant refusal to recognise their rights in the mid-nineteenth century, and just how far have we left to go to achieve the ultimate aspiration of an equitable synthesis?

Sir Paul Coleridge in his speech “Lobbing a few pebbles in the pond; the funeral of a dead parrot’ during the Family Law Conference 2013 observed that ‘ if we can agree about one thing today it is surely the world we inhabit today is not the same world as we inhabited in 1950”, thus calling for a drastic change, if not a metamorphosis, in the current family law of UK. It is no doubt that the traditional idea of the family has changed significantly. Prima facie, the Cabinet Office and Department for Children, Schools and Families in their evidence paper, Families in Britain published in December 2008 suggested that “there is arguably no longer a one-size fits all family in Britain today. But this is diversity and not decline. The reality in many people's everyday lives is that more and more families experience a range of family forms throughout their life time. There is no single family form that guarantees happiness or success’.  

 ‘Cohabitation’ and ‘cohabitant’ can somewhat be a difficult topic to clarify. Clarification from this muddle, The Family Law Act 1996 defined ‘cohabitation’ as ‘a man and woman who, although not married to each other, are living together as husband and wife’. However, such definition is limited, as it does not acknowledge same-sex couples. In struggling to define what is meant by ‘cohabitation’, the case of Kimber v Kimber (2001) had laid down criteria which include membership of same household, sharing daily life, stability, financial support, sexual relationship, children and public acknowledgement. Such criteria are useful to see what the state regards as hallmarks of a ‘cohabiting’ relationship.

In discussing the various issues surrounding cohabitation, it is essential to analyse the aims and strategies of the Law Commission’s report ‘Cohabitation: The Financial Consequences of Relationship Breakdown (Law Com No. 307)’, in relation to the need for reform with regard to cohabitation. It suggests that there is a significant change in social attitude and the current law is inadequate and out-dated. Therefore, legal remedies should be in place to protect cohabiting couples should they separate in future. However, it can be argued that although there is a change in social attitude towards cohabitation, individuals who believe in the sanctity and religious views of marriage maybe offended at the way in which the significance of marriage has been de-emphasised.

Law of Property or Family Law?
Samantha Singer (2009) has noted that ‘the range of property law principles and approaches available produce an unnecessarily expensive and cumbersome process for the often distressed law client’. Furthermore, Gilmore and Glennan (2012) argued that the current law is unsatisfactory and their property rights should be determined by a family law, not a property law regime. The central belief is that cohabitants are able to protect themselves against economic disadvantages through measures such as placing property in joint names. However, this belief has proven not always to be of actuality.

In Stack v Dowden, unequal shares were declared on the basis that the parties kept their financial affairs separate and the claimant made greater financial contributions. In Jones v Kernott, the trial judge rules that the claimant’s investment towards the purchase of property, particularly since separation, meant that she was entitled to greater shares. Stuart Bridge in ‘Cohabitation: Why legislative reform is necessary?(2007) suggested that ‘the current law is complex, uncertain and likely to give rise to unfair outcomes because it does not take into account the economic consequences of contributions made by parties, particularly non-financial contributions such as one partner giving up work to raise a child.’ In evaluating Stack v Dowden and Jones v Kernott, there is evidence to suggest that the law relating to property seems somewhat ‘at sixes and sevens’ and may differ depending on the circumstances on every case. This point, in turn, ties in with the current law on resulting and constructive trusts. A party contributing financially would be entitled to a share in property, however, the Law Commission argued that the constructive trusts cannot accommodate ‘contingent’ intentions and that the Court is unable to substitute its view of what is fair, but must adhere to the intentions of parties.

In evaluating this point, it is inferred that regardless of the financial contributions made in a cohabiting relationship, the rights that cohabitee think they have in equity, is in fact not always the case. In actuality, economic disadvantages may still occur irrespective of a joint tenancy being in place or not which would be defeating the whole purpose of what is called ‘equity’ in terms of being fair, just and impartial. Baroness Hale commented on this contentious issue by stating, “There is some reason to think that a family law remedy as proposed by the Law Commission would be less costly and more productive of settlements as well as achieving fairer results than the present law”.

The Obligations & Financial Responsibility
Edward Hess in ‘The rights of cohabitants: When or how will the law be reformed’ (2009) suggested that it is easy to identify a marriage certificate but it maybe much more difficult to pin down precisely what amounts to cohabitation. It can be argued that some of the individuals that choose to cohabit may not want the formality or legal obligation that the state may impose on them upon entering into a marriage or civil partnership. Conversely, the Law Commission argued this point by stating that many cohabitants think it wrong to marry purely for legal or financial reasons and they may not be willing to get married unless they can do it ‘properly'. Baroness Hale in Gow v Grant (2012) stated that, “For many couples, cohabitations is the preliminary to the marriage they hope to enter into one day”. In agreement with this point, it is also necessary to consider the financial responsibility involved in entering a marriage or civil partnership and whether individuals have the capability to engage in such.

Also, there are many circumstances where one cohabitee has relied heavily upon heavily their partner and has been at an economic disadvantage on separation. A classic example of this point was picked up on in the Scottish case of Gow v Grant. Here, the Supreme Court’s decision was in favour of the claimant as she had suffered economic disadvantage by cohabiting with her partner. Baroness Hale suggested that there are lessons to be learned from this case in England and Wales. The main lesson from this case is that a remedy such as this is both practicable and fair, focusing on where parties were at the beginning of the relationship and where they are at the end. It does not impose upon unmarried couples the responsibilities of marriage but redresses the gains and losses flowing from their relationship. Subsequently, Steve Kirwan who leads Resolution's work on cohabitation, proposed an ‘opt in’ scheme which would require couples to register in order to claim financial remedies upon separation. However, there is evidence to suggest that as some couple still believe in the ‘common law marriage’ myth, it would be unlikely to assume that these couples would engage in such a scheme.

Commentaries
With the very nature and fluidity of Family law, many attempts at cohabitation law are met with a high degree of confusion even by the most learned minds. The burning question now becomes whether cohabitants should be given more protection or whether the current law should stand still and strong as it is now? The story so far suggest an uneasy compromise falling somewhere between these polar opposites. Perhaps a few commentaries, particularly by Peter Tatchell and Baroness Deech may clear the fog that blurs the eyes of law.

Peter Thatchell - The time for equality is now.
“In a democratic society, everyone should be equal before the law. This includes the right of same-sex couples to marry and be just as happy – or miserable – as married heterosexuals”. These wise words come from Peter Tatchell who is the pioneer of Equal Love campaign. He is in favour of broader, non-discriminatory and flexible system of partnership. The Equal Love campaign petitioned to end the bans on same-sex civil marriages and opposite-sex civil partnerships which contradict article 8, 12 and 14 of the ECHR. The bans on same-sex civil marriages and on opposite sex civil partnership is discriminatory and offensive. There is one law for straight couples and another law for gay partners. Two wrongs don’t make a right. Hence, any reforms brought forward by this campaign that would change the law of cohabitation are much anticipated in the near future.

Baroness Deech – A windfall for lawyers?
Conversely, Baroness Deech’s speech on cohabitation caused controversy after she described Lord Lester's proposals as "a windfall for lawyers but for no one else except the gold digger" and that it "retards the emancipation of women". Similarly, Professor Cretney who is a former law commissioner, questioned the uncertainties on why those cohabitants who express distaste for marriage should want the benefits of a comparable legal regime of a married couple.

Prima facie, the law is inconsistent and tends to treat woman as dependents who have to be kept. Baroness Deech was of the view that woman of the 20th century should be able to exercise free choice whether or not to stay at home and care for the children despite single or cohabiting. The Bill, if passed, will label women as worth what their man is worth, once and for all. Her preference is for the rights of an individual. Such rights include autonomy, privacy, a sphere of thought and action that should be free from public or legal interference. Baroness Deech encouraged cohabitants to make binding prenuptial or postnuptial agreement and that current law, which is the law of trusts and Schedule 1 Children’s Act 1989, are sufficient enough to govern cohabitants.

The Approach of Other Jurisdictions
The approach of other European and Commonwealth countries to financial provisions for cohabitants on separation is considerably more progressive and far-reaching than the proposals made by the Law Commission. In fact, the approaches of some countries such as Belgium, Denmark and Sweden have had some form of legislation in place for several years. The approaches taken by these countries is to develop the idea of civil union whereby the law recognises defacto partnerships between unmarried persons. In New Zealand, the Civil Union Act has been in place since 2004 and extends certain rights and obligations to cohabitants. The Netherlands introduced registered partnerships in 1998 and, despite the fact that the driving force behind this was to benefit same sex couples, statistics had shown one third of registered partnerships were entered into by heterosexual couples. Arguably, the greatest development of the civil union concept has occurred in France. In 1999, the French government introduced the pacte civil de solidarite (PACS) which has proved to be a popular alternative to marriage amongst cohabiting couples.  It confers fewer rights and imposes fewer responsibilities than marriage and has become socially acceptable in France. Hughes, David and Jacklin (2008) in “Come live with me and be my love(2008) have expressed strong support for the use of PACS in the UK, however, the Law Commission made no reference to PACS in its report. Thus, there remains when the idea of PACS will sprout up again.

In sum, borrowing the words from Sir Paul Coleridge verbatim, “the days of the gladiatorial wars of the titans are over. The dinosaurs have had their day”. The law on cohabitation during the 19th century no longer fit any purpose. It was designed in a wholly different era to deal with a wholly different society and way of life. In the immortal words of John Cleese, it is a dead parrot. It is no more; it has gone to meet its maker. Family law in the UK ought to be more innovative and much more daring when dealing with cohabitation. Therefore, it is necessary for the government to look into some of the pressing issues on cohabitation in order for it to be dealt with accordingly.


Differences Between Left Realism And Right Realism

Right realism first materialized in both America and the UK during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The philosophies behind right realism were influenced strongly by the political stance at the time - what is known as Thatcherism. During this time period, the UK was run by a Conservative Government, and experienced a major shift in economical and political debate, which was arguably symptomatic of the change in the global economic climate. As a result of this detrimental shift, the Government chose to make public expenditure cuts, consequently placing public services in the spotlight (Walklate, 2007). This change transformed the way in which social problems were dealt with, and thus, had an impact on crime control strategies. Social problems, such as unemployment, had conventionally been dealt with through Government investment in the social welfare system, by addressing issues of poverty, which should, in turn, have reduced the crime rates. However, these rates still appeared to be rising, creating an aetiological crisis. Right realists began to argue that crime is an act of free will and therefore individual offenders should receive harsher punishments for their actions rather than being offered forms of rehabilitation (Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985). They also theorised that crime was a real problem within society which destroyed communities and social cohesion, therefore they were seen to pay little interest in different causes of crime, instead they focused on being seen to actually do something about it, for example harsh punishments (Jones, 2009).

In contrast to right realism, left realism emerged later in the mid 1980s stemming from left idealism as a policy-oriented intercession focusing primarily on the reality of crime for victims. It came as a reaction to the traditional law and order politics and held opposing views to right realist theories. Former left idealists and former radical criminologists such as Lea & Young (1984) began to present ideologies which took a more realistic approach to crime control, and challenged right realists by arguing that the causation of crime comes from a mixture of relative deprivation and individualism which, consequently, created widespread aggression and anti-social behaviour leading to criminal activity. This will be discussed in more depth in the course of the essay. Left realists also reject previous theories, such as the labelling theory, put forward by right-wing politicians as they believe these to be unrealistic (Treadwell, 2006).
This essay will evaluate three of the main aspects of criminology in terms of left and right realism: the definition of crime, the causes of crime and finally the responses to crime. It will focus on how both left and right realists attempt to explain the causation of crime, together with their suggestions for realistic crime control strategies. It will evaluate the areas of these ideologies which share similarities, as well as considering their views which differentiate.
Definition of crime
According to right realists, crime is not a social construction, it is in fact real and the fear of crime in society is completely reasonable (Jones, 2009). They use official crime statistics, such as the British Crime Survey, in order to draw analyses to support the opinion that crime is a problem in society and that it is not just an exaggeration of stories within the mass media. Despite acknowledging that crime as a whole is real, right realists tend to focus on crimes that they view as being ‘visible’, for example street crimes and burglary. These crimes tend to produce more fear among the public (Hopkins Burke, 2005) as they are crimes which arguably occur more often to the average person. Right realists thus pay little attention to crimes that are viewed as being ‘victimless’, such as white-collar offences. However, these crimes can be just as harmful, as evidence shows that organisations lose an estimated 5% of their revenue to fraud every year (Sutherland, 2002; ACFE, 2012). This under-representation of attention to ‘victimless’ crimes may be due to right realists’ use of only official statistics in their assessment of crime. ‘Victimless’ crimes may be harder to detect, thus it would appear that they rarely emerge in official recorded statistics (Dutcher, 2005). It may also be because victims are often required to provide insurance companies with crime numbers in order to make a claim (Jenkins, 2000): hence the rise in recorded street crimes such as property and vehicle theft.
Left realists also hold similar ideologies towards the definition of crime. They too, argue that crime is a real problem that needs to be taken seriously, and it affects those in relative deprivation much more seriously than the affluent (Young, 1997). However, they believe that official statistics such as the British Crime Survey do not provide a realistic representation of crime. Left realists argue that many crimes go unreported to the authorities, so rely heavily on victim surveys. Thus these surveys produce a wider picture of the amount of crimes that actually occur (Young & Mathews, 1992).However, critics of left realists often argue that they put too much emphasis on the victims, and sideline the offender, giving them a peripheral role in their theories (Young, 1996). In parallel to right realists, left realists also focus their attention on visible crimes, for example, street crimes, rather than corporate and white collar crimes. They both believe that it is important for politicians to address issues causing street crime as they are the crimes of most public concern (ibid). However, unlike right realists, left realists suggest that in order to fully respond to the problem of crime, the Criminal Justice process should address all the aspects involved and affected by crime: the offender, the victim, the Criminal Justice System and the general public. This is discussed further during this essay. Despite acknowledging all aspects of the Criminal Justice System, it can be argued that because the work of left realists is reliant on victims’ surveys, they too, ignore crimes such as domestic violence, female-perpetrated offences, and crimes where someone may not realise they have been a victim, as these are not always present in victim surveys (Jones, 2009; Dragiewicz, 2010).
The cause of crime
The causation of crime is a central topic of criminological debate. As stated by right realists, crime is an act of free will in which individuals make a choice to engage in, and can be a result of feckless socialisation (Wilson & Hernstein, 1985). By using this argument, it can be pointed out that a disproportionate amount of criminal offences are committed by young males living in city centres due to the poor socialisation that they have experienced (ibid). Several right realists also believe that some individuals are more likely to engage in crime due to their genetic make-up (Tierney, 2009). Thus, right realism argues that criminality is a result of a mixture between biological and social environment. However, Wilson (1985) argues that this is slightly conflicting, as if an individual is predisposed towards committing a crime, then surely they themselves cannot be fully responsible for their actions.
The causation of crime being down to social environment and biological factors is supported by Murray’s (1990) ‘underclass’ thesis, which describes how members of the underclass choose a criminal lifestyle because of the Government’s generous treatment of the unemployed, and arguably, the lenience shown towards criminals, leading them into a culture of worklessness and criminal careers. He contended that this group within society has an inability to teach their children social norms and values, thus passing down the culture of worklessness. This is supported by Lewis (1961) who suggested that if children learn certain survival mechanisms early in life, such as stealing, then they are less likely to succeed in future life, thus, potentially leading them to a criminal career. However, this is rejected by Shildrick et al. (2012), through their empirical research, which found that there was no evidence in their sample to suggest that cultures of worklessness are passed down by generations. In fact, many of their participants showed signs of strong working values which disagrees with ideologies of the underclass thesis. Another critique of this concept is that it marginalises the poor into one aggregate group, misrepresenting the reality that not all individuals from poor backgrounds turn to criminal lifestyles (Cameron et al., 2012). Despite these criticisms, the underclass thesis has been hugely influential on Government and Criminal Justice policies, as Murray (2003) proposed that harsher treatment of criminals will deter the ‘underclass’ from readily committing crimes and may change their attitudes. This theory conflicts with the ideologies of left realists as they argue that more attention needs to be paid to protecting victims rather than just giving harsher punishments (Lea, 2010). This is discussed further during the essay.
The lack of social norms present in the’ underclass’ thesis are also present in the broken window theory (Wilson & Kelling, 2003). This right realism theory presented the concept that within a community, there may be signs such as broken windows and other forms of vandalism, which create an image that crime is acceptable in that area. Consequently, the incivilities according to this theory encourage more people into criminal activities, and make this form of behaviour a norm in society. Right realists argue that such behaviour also stems from the disrespect for Criminal Justice authorities. Arguably, if the police are not taken seriously by individuals, they clearly do not act as an effective deterrent (Wilson, 2003). Historically, crime was constructed by Marxists as a conflict between the bourgeoisie and proletarians. It was the working class who were heavily policed during the 19th Century, which is often still the case in the present day (Foucault, 1997; Matthews, 2009). Thus, it is unsurprising that theories of right realism share similar constructs as they were developed during the same time period which viewed the working class as being responsible for the majority of crime. Despite little research on the broken window theory, like the underclass thesis, it attracted the attention of politicians and became very influential in their development of policies which addressed anti-social behaviour in the community and increase severity of punishments (Hopkins Burke, 2009). This reaction, involving mainly just the offender and the Criminal Justice System, differs from theories expressed by left realists, who believe that in order to tackle crime completely, policies need to include all the various aspects involved and not just an offender-centred view. This leads on to their key argument involving the ‘square of crime’
Lea (2010) theorised that left realism attempts to depict the interactions between the offender, victims, law enforcement and the wider community in a ‘square of crime’, which is something that right realists fail to acknowledge. This key left realist argument focuses on how crime comes to be in existence and is analysed using the interaction of these four elements (see diagram over page) (Lea, 1992). In this sense, left realists were adamant that the police need to be part of the community and reflect their needs rather than just meeting the governmental targets. Thus, crime is a reaction derived from the poor social relationships amidst each of the elements in the square. As Young (n/d) argues, it is the relationship between the offender and the victim which actuates the impact of a particular crime, the relationship between the offender and the Criminal Justice System which effects recidivism, and the relationship between the Criminal Justice agencies and the wider community which determines the efficiency of crime control and policing. Therefore, this theory looks at how the interaction between each of these elements of the square has an impact on the existence of criminality. For example, if the relationship between the offender and the Criminal Justice agencies is poor, then this may cause increased rates of recidivism, thus increasing overall crime rates. This is a contradiction to right realist ideology, which places the blame of crime primarily with the responsibility of the offender, and does not acknowledge how there are other elements which may also cause a crime to occur.
Left realists ‘square of crime’
When looking at the concepts presented by right realists earlier in the essay, they largely focused on street crimes, viewing criminals as being from the underclass. Left realists challenge this opinion by using Merton’s (1968) strain theory to explain crime. This theory suggests that capitalism drives some individuals to desire certain things in life, for example, material possessions and having a high income, however these are not always met, which consequently causes a strain. This strain then causes them to turn to crime, commonly acquisitive property crimes, in order to achieve these expectations. Conversely, Young (2007) has more recently drawn attention to crime being a result of desire for excitement and thrill, rather than just materialistic gain. Such criminals are not interested in gaining something physical from the criminal act, but see it more as a form of excitement to replace feelings of boredom, which makes the strain theory invalid for some such criminals. Nonetheless some left realists continue to argue that the strain felt by some individuals can be present in all levels of social class, as there will always be social expectations, no matter what class status someone holds (Langton & Piquero, 2007). This proves that crime can be committed by members of every social-class level, and not just by the ‘underclass’, as is argued by right realists. In association with this theory, left realists argue that the concept of relative deprivation also causes crime. This is described as taking place when poverty and resources are allocated unfairly. As a result, people resort to crime to provide a solution to this unfair allocation of resources (Schwartz & DeKeseredy, 2010). This theory normally refers to people who are from the working class, although, Lea (1992) acknowledges that this inability to achieve life goals and successes again exists throughout all social classes. However, left realists do share opinions with right realists in the sense that they accept that criminals are accountable somewhat for their own actions and agree that there is an element of free will involved in criminal activity. However, they strongly maintain that the social elements stated above do act as the reason for choosing to commit a crime (Lea & Young, 2003).
The preceding left realist opinion is evident in another of their key arguments, relating to marginalisation. They believe that there is a social prejudice which marginalizes particular sections of society. These groups tend to lack clear goals and have no official organisation to defend their interests, so feel as if they have been neglected by society, and consequently resort to criminal behaviour (Lea, 2010). This is in contrast to right realism, which fails to acknowledge that there are groups within society that are pushed to the outskirts and marginalised and thus experience deprivation at the hands of those seen as superior e.g. the upper class. However, there is a right realist counter-argument of this relating to ration choice, by arguing that marginalisation and relative deprivation theory does not account for those who experience deprivation and poverty, but nonetheless choose not to engage in criminal behaviour (Morrison, 1995). Moreover, this theory contradicts itself by actually grouping the deprived together and not taking into consideration individual difference. While this may be true, the statistical likelihood is that individuals from run down and neglected areas are much more likely to commit crimes, nonetheless, presenting a criticism of this right realist counter-argument (Gabbidon & Boisvert, 2012).
Responses to crime
The potential causation of crime is essential for an understanding of how it should be dealt with. As previously discussed, left realists created the ‘square of crime’ with four elements which can add to successful crime control when effective intervention is present between each element. This emphasises one of the key principles of left realism: that a ‘multi-causal’ approach can help tackle crime control. For example, Lea & Young (1984) theorised that one effective intervention would be to use victim surveys, which arguably provide a more accurate account of crime and its fear in the community, instead of official statistics. It has also been recognised that despite arguments by Marxists, the fear of crime is not just a false consciousness formed by media-influenced moral panics. It is, in fact, based on real life experiences (Tierney, 1996). This revelation was influential in raising awareness regarding the impact of crime on victims, hence conquering their marginalisation and providing them with a voice, which ultimately can help to effectively respond to crime in the community.
This led to one of the most predominant and successful contributions that left realism gave to the study of criminology, namely the revelation that the fear of crime was a social problem in society. By expressing this opinion, left realists believe that if government officials focus on improving relationships between the police, victims and the wider community, then people may be more willing to report crimes (Hopkins Burke, 2009). It can be argued that improving these relationships may also tackle the fear of crime. For example, Jones (2009) claims that if people do not have faith in the police to control crime, then more fear may occur within the wider community. Therefore, it would be appropriate to restore this faith and improve the relationship between the police and wider community in order to reduce the fear of crime. Thus, by using the ‘square of crime’, left realists are able to provide realistic and effective crime control strategies which include every element of the Criminal Justice process. Left realists also draw attention to the effectiveness of neighbourhood watch schemes which result from improved relationships between the police and the wider community. Nevertheless, these schemes hold the preconception that criminals are unknown to the community (Rosenbaum, 1987), and thus overlook the reality of crimes such as domestic violence where the victim is known to the offender. Furthermore, many criminologists reject the arguments of left realists, as they feel that their arguments are just an oversimplified version of left idealism and nothing has actually changed from their theories, as left idealists supported crime solutions involving community groups wanting change to the Criminal Justice System (Marsh, 2006).
Right realists, as opposed to left realists, take a more punitive standpoint when dealing with crime. As discussed previously, they believe that if a person makes the choice to commit a criminal act, then they should be punished. Wilson (2003) suggests that to protect the public from harm, retributive punishment is required for those who break the laws set by the state, and also those who break social norms. Right realism focuses on the need for more prisons, and increasing the duration of sentences, in other words that practicality should be implemented and criminality should be dealt with when it occurs (Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985). They advocate that the police should focus on tackling first-time drug users, rather than drug dealers, the users being the more ‘visible’ criminals in the community, and more likely to be deterred by harsher prison sentences in the early stages of their criminal career (ibid). A critique of this is the much debated argument over the limited success incarceration has in reducing crime (Currie, 2007). It appears that right realists do not consider the degree of effectiveness of prison sentences and ignore alternative punishments.
It can also be argued that right realist theories focus on crimes committed by the ‘underclass’, and it is not clear whether they believe that upper class crimes should also be dealt with in same punitive way, especially as for the past couple of centuries, imprisonment has been seen to be a sanction primarily reserved for the lower classes (Reiman, 2004). As well as increasing the severity of punishment, many rational choice theorists, such as Wilson & Herrnstein (1985), believed that there is a need to increase the cost of crime, in the sense that the cost of getting caught is increased. For example, increasing police presence and security on properties may increase criminals’ chances of being caught and thus deter them from committing crimes in the first place. It is interesting to note that this argument relates to that of left realism, as they argue for different agencies to work together in order to prevent crime from happening. This is similar to the opinion presented by rational choice theorists as if they believe that both the police and the wider community must implement certain crime prevention aspects e.g. increasing security on buildings, then surely that must mean they agree somewhat with left realists’ ‘square of crime’, as they believe that if some elements work together it could decrease crime rates.
This shared ideology is also present in the argument that both left and right realists agree that the police can only do so much to tackle crime. However, instead of increasing police powers which is suggested by right realists, left realists have theorised that more attention needs to be paid to tackling social control which ultimately will help prevent crimes from occurring (Marsh, 2006). For example, if the Government and local authorities are able to provide people with more jobs with a future, this might solve the problem of people committing crimes relating to relative deprivation and the strain theory, as they will have a steady income. Also if the local authorities can improve the quality of community areas, then they may provide a better sense of belonging within the community (Young, 1997), and thus the residents will respect their areas more, resulting in less social disorder which could lead to crime. Furthermore, this is an interesting eco of the broken window theory which presents another point of cross over between left and right realism. Therefore, left realists believe that in order to tackle crime completely, more needs to be done to address the underlying causes of crime rather than just punishing offenders, especially in areas which have high rates of social disorder.
Conclusion
Assessing the main arguments of left and right realism, it is easy to identify the similarities between the two. It was clear from the outset that they both take a practical approach to crime, acknowledging the damaging consequences and seeking material interventions to reduce it. This, as Young (1994) points out, is in contrast to left idealism criminology. They also both attempt to influence criminal policy by providing realistic suggestions of how to tackle crime, and agreeing that the Government cannot just put money into crime solutions without them first being fully researched (ibid). Despite these positive aspects that have emerged as a result of right and left realism, they have both been faced with similar criticisms. One predominant criticism is that both focus primarily on crimes committed by the underclass and those from deprived backgrounds, thus ignoring the existence of white collar and corporate crimes, which are arguably just as harmful (Sutherland, 2002). A similar criticism is presented by feminists, who argued that realism focuses primarily on male crimes, and they neglect women in their study of crime (Dragiewicz, 2010). Marsh (2006) argues that women in society are often denied the same opportunities as men, including taking part in deviant activities, even though it has been proved through statistics that women do also commit crimes. Therefore the theories presented by realists are an unrepresentative view and are only relevant to certain types of crimes, for example, street crimes. Furthermore, they cannot claim to consider the reality of crime, if they, themselves, do not focus on all crimes and types of criminals in society.
As well as viewing the similarities between right and left realism, it is also possible to identify differences between them. One of the paramount differences is that each provides contrasting definitions of crime; right realism sees criminals as making a choice to engage in deviant behaviour, whereas left realism focuses on the impact that relative deprivation and individualism has on communities, which causes them to commit crimes. As previously discussed, this theory acts as a basis for how left realists believe that crime should be dealt with. By developing the ‘square of crime’, Young (1997) was able to show that by improving the relationships between each element (victim, offender, Criminal Justice agencies and the wider community) it can address the issues that cause crime. Left realists also identify that there is a need to address issues of social order which are proven to lead to criminal behaviour. This is a conflicting suggestion for crime control than that which is present in right realism ideology which focuses on a more punitive stance to addressing crime. They believe that criminals make the choice to commit a criminal offence, and that therefore they should be severely punished for doing so (Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985).
In conclusion, regardless of holding differing political stances, right and left realism both emerged as a result from previous criminologist ideologies which were seen as not addressing the reality of crime. They both believe that crime needs to be taken seriously and that fear of crime is not just a consequence of media-influenced moral panics. Realists thus focus on specific crimes which are seen to be the centre of concern within society, and try to put forward realistic suggestions of crime control through social reform (Matthews, 2009). Although right and left realists may share similarities in terms of their intentions, the key arguments and theories they present regarding the causation of crime and crime control differentiate in many ways. Therefore, in order to provide effective crime control strategies, it may be beneficial for the state to reflect on both sides of realism, as well as other criminological approaches, in order to address the wider picture of crime
Source